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The trade in material goods from Asia to Europe – the ERC project 
Our jointly-written paper arises out of a major European Research Council Project:  ‘Europe’s 
Asian Centuries: Trading Eurasia 1600-1830’. 1 The project is about the trade in material goods from 
Asia to Europe over this period.  It asks the question: how did Asia’s manufactured products affect 
Europe’s industrial and consumer culture in the early modern period.  It entails a comparative study 
of Europe’s East India Companies and the private trade from Asia over the period, a study of how 
products made in Asia were produced, adapted to European tastes and distributed back to Europe, 
thus forming an export-ware sector, and a study of European consumer, manufacturing and political 
responses to this trade.  This is a study of the first Global Age as this affected Europe in terms of 
manufacturing and consumption.  It also relates closely to issues of fine manufacturing and luxury 
goods in the current age of globalization.  There are now many parallels in the adaptation of skills to 
new wider world markets. 
The project addresses the part played by mercantile trade with Asia in the origins of the 
Industrial Revolution.  It engages with the global history literature on divergences and connections 
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between Europe and Asia.  But hitherto much of the subject has been focussed on the economics of 
trade flows, commodity chains, and the politics of colonial domination. There has been much less 
intensive focus on the products traded, how they were made, marketed and distributed in Asia, en 
route from Asia and in Europe. We seek to move the subject out to analyse the exchange of material 
culture and the transmission of knowledge, including that of skills, design and materials.  The project 
brings together the study of trade, of consumption and of production. What we seek to do, 
therefore, is to work at the interface of histories of consumer and material cultures and the big 
questions asked by economic historians. Those histories of material culture until recently were 
largely the domain of museology and art history; global approaches now allow us to bring together 
these fields.  Our project engages closely with the research done hitherto on Europe’s East India 
companies and the private trade associated with this.  Here we take a transnational approach, 
focussing in particular on questions of the organisation of trade and networks, on sales and markets, 
as well as on the wider impact of the East India trade on Europe’s political and moral economies. A 
more ‘connected’ history of the different East India Companies will help us to understand the wider 
European context in which these early modern trading enterprises operated. 
 Our central concerns are with issues of products, quality, luxury and consumer culture. Just 
how did Europe’s pursuit of quality goods turn a pre-modern encounter with precious cargoes into a 
modern globally-organized trade in Asian export ware? This was a trade to Europe of nearly 5 million 
pieces of textiles between 1670 and 1760, and over 70 million pieces of porcelain between 1600 and 
1800. There were high levels of smuggling and private trade which are not even counted in this data.  
Our project focuses on the major manufactured Asian imports, textiles and porcelain, but  also 
includes other manufactures from brass and ironware to paper goods, lacquerware, furnishings and 
dyes.  We are also investigating the emergence of fine quality distinctions in the tea trade. 
Export Ware 
We want to know how merchants, supercargoes, East India companies, dealers and 
manufacturers transformed objects which once entered Europe only as oriental luxuries into an 
Asian export-ware sector of high-quality consumer products.   As manufactures, these Asian 
consumer goods demanded complex skills, networks of information, communication arteries and 
nodes of knowledge, production and distribution.2 There was a large-scale organization of an ‘export 
ware’ product.  We need to understand how manufacturing export ware sectors developed in Asia 
just before and during this period.  Focused on delivering designs to meet European tastes, 
delivering high volumes and responding to new fashion, these export ware sectors met demands for 
quality, reliability, and standards.  They also created a highly-charged competitive atmosphere of 
trade, product development and invention.  
Our research on different types of export wares, on different types and qualities of goods 
imported has also brought us to engage closely with the recent a renewed interest in private and 
privilege trade. Organizing a trade in these goods brings into the frame a number of figures who 
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have thus far been had only limited consideration as part of the Companies’ activities. Wholesalers, 
retailers, artisans, merchant-bankers, commercial agents, consuls, captains and supercargoes were 
all engaged in the distribution (legal and illicit) of Oriental luxuries; they helped to shape tastes and 
to create growing markets in Europe through re-export, private commissions and commercial 
speculation. Their stories form part of the complex ways in which goods, knowledge, trading 
practices and people circulated in Eurasia, constantly crossing national and regional boundaries. 
One area of research we are interested in is the mapping of different or possibly overlapping 
markets for Company goods across Europe. Another area is the relationship between private and 
Company trade and sales, touching on profits, procedures and the role played by marketing.  The 
quality of goods is a topic little studied in work on the Eurasia trade. This applies both to the 
Companies’ efforts to control the quality of their imports from China and India, as well as to the 
question of the role that ‘quality’ played in consumer demand and competition. In order to link the 
research on the European East India Companies to concepts such as the early modern ‘consumer 
revolution’, it is necessary to map changes in both qualities and quantities of goods brought in from 
Asia. 
Historiography    
We aim to link up the separate histories of European industrialization and consumer cultures 
with those on trade and colonization. European narratives of industrialization and consumer culture 
provide one backdrop to recent research on Europe’s Asian trade.  From the 1970s onwards 
economic histories of the industrial revolution became increasingly inward looking; they focussed on 
long-term quantitative indices of demographic and productivity change. Long-distance trade that 
could be measured was dismissed as a minor feature, and the origins of industrialization were 
rooted by a whole generation of historians in long-term endogenous and agrarian change.3  Yet 
separate studies of consumption by social and cultural historians revealed the emergence from the 
mid seventeenth century of a widespread purchase of new commodities, including tea and 
manufactured goods from Asia – textiles and porcelain. Likewise historians who drew on 
archaeological, museum-based and visual sources discovered a wider-world impact on European 
material cultures. There were through this period key studies of Europe and the wider world, but 
these were focussed on Europe, European encounters and expansion: Braudel’s Civilization and 
Capitalism, Wallerstein’s The Modern World System and Eric Jones’ The European Miracle. But these 
assumed concepts of Asiatic modes of production, comparing dynamic Europe with static Asian 
civilizations.4 
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There has, however, during this past ten years been a turning to global history that has 
affected the way we now look at Europe in the early modern period and the eighteenth century.  
The recent rise of China and India as the most rapidly growing world economies and a wide political 
economy of globalization has led to questions over earlier phases of globalization.  Did the opening 
of long-distance oceanic trade around the Cape of Good Hope constitute a phase of proto-
globalization, as argued by Christopher Bayly, and debated by O’Rourke and Williamson?  The big 
issues of the new global history, however, were focussed on questions of ‘the great divergence’.  
Ken Pomeranz made China the focus of comparison, arguing that Europe’s departure onto self-
sustaining paths of economic growth only started from c. 1800, and was based largely on 
environmental factors and greater energy efficiency gained in the use of coal.  Trade played no part 
in the divergence debate.  Europe was compared, but not connected to China and the rest of Asia.5 
One of those connections is the trade in goods that linked merchant communities and 
stimulated information flows. But we must turn to a separate historiography on this, that on the 
economics of trade flows, on the business organization of East India Companies and on the politics 
of colonial domination.   These studies have provided us with highly aggregative economic studies of 
trade flows, as conveyed most recently in O’Rourke and Findlay’s Power and Plenty:  Trade, War and 
the World Economy in the Second Millennium (2007).  They provided a fine tradition of business 
histories of the East India Companies during the 1970s, and from the 1980s a whole tradition of 
studies of Indian Ocean merchants and their interactions with the East India Companies.  There is a 
recent turn to interests in merchant networks and private trade, but the key focus of much of this 
research has been on malfeasance, principal – agent problems and company organization.6 Our 
focus is on the trade in specific consumer goods, especially a focus on variety and qualities. This 
agenda has involved engaging with objects – taking an approach through material culture, and it 
involves a global approach.   
Our focus on the products traded also demands that we look specifically at private and 
privilege trade, and increasing place played by such trade.  Earlier historians of trade with India drew 
attention to the role of private traders , especially Peter Marshall and Om Prakash.  Much of this 
early work on private trade focussed on relations between private traders and the East India 
Company, and their part in the shift of the East India Company to territorial dominion.7 New work, 
such as that by Søren Mentz, now focuses on these traders’ expertise and the ways in which they 
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worked in the rhythms of Indian Ocean trade, as well as on their networks with merchants in 
London.  In particular they played a key role in trading specialist goods between Asia and Europe as 
well as within Asia.  Huw Bowen’s recent  article, ‘Privilege and Profit:  Commanders of East 
Indiamen as Private Traders, Entrepreneurs and Smugglers, 1760-1813’ examines freight-free private 
trade between Britain and Asia.  This privilege trade was the key way in which most of the luxury 
goods reaching Europe from Asia in the eighteenth century were brought in.  The whole system 
relied on the expertise of commanders and supercargoes who might gain an average on this trade of 
£4,000-£5,000 a voyage.8 
Alongside this ‘privilege’ trade within EIC voyages and conducted by EIC employees, there 
was another world of private traders and merchants who both provided for the intra-Asian trade 
and functioned as intermediaries along with Asian merchants for providing the privilege trade.  The 
private papers of many merchants are now yielding up family histories and wider business dealing of 
this group.  Linda Colley’s The Ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh (2007) recounts how James Crisp tried to 
function as an independent merchant competing with the Company to access quality cloth from 
weavers near Dhaka during the 1760s.  Emma Rothschild’s The Inner Life of Empire (2011) and 
Margot Finn’s recent articles recount the private dealings as well as Company lives of Anglo-Indian 
families.  More than trade and Company employment these family lives of Anglo-Indians brought an 
orientalism to British culture and fostered the acquisition of luxury goods and collections in British 
families.9 
 We wish to discover how private trade functioned alongside and in connection with the 
various European East India companies; we will investigate how this changed over time, how it drew 
on the Company infrastructure, and how it took the risk and developed new and niche markets for 
specific Asian commodities that the Companies could not sustain. 
The Size of East India Company Trade 
Asian goods held a special fascination in European imaginations.  The early goods traded were 
exotic and ornamental luxuries and goods that appealed to the senses, traded mainly over land 
routes from one merchant group to the next.  Many historians  discounted their significance because 
these were luxuries; they were about elites, and they did not figure greatly in the national outputs of 
European countries.  Immanuel Wallerstein and the world system theorists dismissed the Asia trade 
as one in ‘preciosities’. But Adam Smith knew their significance went deep into social structures and 
cultural mentalities. He argued that ‘exotic baubles’ motivated elites to shift from showing their 
status by keeping a lot of retainers; instead they acquired objects.  The result was to increase the 
profitability of their estates and to undermine their political power.  This power shifted to towns, 
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merchants and capitalist tenant farmers.10  He went on to argue that ‘The discovery of America, and 
that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope are the two greatest and most 
important events in the history of mankind.’11 
The main commodities of long distance trade between 1500 and 1800 were sugar, tobacco, tea, 
coffee, cocoa, opium, pepper and spices, silk and silver, wider cotton textiles and porcelain. None of 
these were basic necessities ; some began as and remained luxuries;  many spread into the 
consumption patterns of ordinary people in Europe. Many were either addictive or fashion goods; 
they were goods that people could be induced to work longer and harder for after their basic needs 
were met; the goods that led to what Jan de Vries called ‘the industrious revolution’, and they had 
the effect of changing work and consumer cultures. Between 1500 and 1795 11,000 European ships 
set out for the Cape route to Asia – 8,000 returned – some were wrecked, but many of these 3,000 
stayed for the intra-Asian trade. Tea, textiles, porcelain, lacquerware , furnishings, drugs and 
dyestuffs made for a systematic global trade carried in quantities which by the later eighteenth 
century came to 50,000 tons a year, as estimated by Jan de Vries.  This made for just over one pound 
of Asian goods per person for a European population of roughly 100 million. 12 If we look to textiles 
and porcelain alone, we see the prodigious amounts of these goods reaching Europe from the 
seventeenth century.  Riello’s recent estimates show 1.3 million pieces of cotton textiles reaching 
Europe by the late 1680s, and 24.3 million pieces over the period 1665-1799. 13 Anthony Farrington’s 
Trading Places.  The East India Company and Asia 1600-1834 (2002) emphasises the quantities and 
diverse qualities of the textiles the Company brought to London by the 1750s: 60% of the value of 
Company sales was comprised of these textiles; a typical order to Bengal in the 1730s was for c. 
590,000 pieces in 38 different types, and 98 different varieties.14  The indicators for porcelain are 
similar. The British alone imported between 1 and 2 million pieces a year of Chinese porcelain by the 
early eighteenth century.  The Dutch imported 43 million pieces from the beginning of the 
seventeenth century to the end of the 18th century.15 The English, French, Danish and Swedish 
companies imported another 30 million pieces. The English East India Company brought in one to 
two million pieces of porcelain from China a year in the early eighteenth century; the French 
200,000 pieces; in one year 1777-8 European ships unloaded 700 tons of porcelain. 
A driving force in the extension of the China trade was the tea trade. Over the later seventeenth  
and the early eighteenth centuries  tea imports increased steadily, amplified over the period by 
smuggling. By the 1770s smuggling dominated the tea trade; in 1783 legal tea in EIC warehouses was  
5.9 millions lbs. and in the same year 7-8 million lbs. were smuggled in. The Tea Commutation Act 
reduced the duty from 119% to 12.5%, and legal tea in the warehouses rose to 16.3 million lbs in 
                                                          
10
 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976) IV.I.10, pp. 183-84. 
11
 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (1776), ed. R.H. Campbell and 
A.S. Skinner,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), IV.vii.c.80, p. 626. 
12
 Jan de Vries, ‘The Limits of Globalization in the Early Modern World’, The Economic History Review, 63 
(2010), pp. 710-733, p. 718. 
13
 Giorgio Riello, Cotton: the Fabric that Changed the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.  
14
 Antony Farrington, Trading Places:  The East India Company and Asia, 1600-1834 (London: The British 
Library, 2002), p. 69. 
15
 Robert Finlay, ‘The Pilgrim Art: the Culture of Porcelain in World History’, The Journal of World History, vol. 9 
(1998), pp. 141-188, p. 168; also Finlay, The Pilgrim Art:  Cultures of Porcelain in World History (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 2010; Maxine Berg, ‘In Pursuit of Luxury’, p. 118. 
7 
 
1785, and 21 million pounds by 1800-1. The EIC’s China trade in these years increased exponentially, 
and its trade shifted from a wide range of imports to a focus on tea, and increasingly on higher 
quality teas. This also affected the porcelain trade.   
 We need also, however, to put the Asian trade in wider perspective. There was steady decadal 
growth of c. 1% per annum up to the estimated figure of 50,000 tons in the late eighteenth century; 
the trade was growing faster than Europe’s population, but not by a great deal.  50,000 tons could 
be fitted into one of today’s container ships. We can compare this with Europe’s growing trade with 
the New World – this grew at 2.2% per year, and the rise in the number of slaves transported from 
Africa to the New World also grew by 2.1% per annum.  But yet these Asian imports by the mid 
eighteenth century were by no means marginal to the European economy.  Jan de Vries estimates 
that another measure, the cumulative value of British, French and Dutch imports from Asia came to 
only 11.5% of their total aggregate imports. Imports from the Western Hemisphere were c. 30% of 
total imports; by value Europe’s imports from the Americas was nearly three times that from Asia.16 
De Vries concludes  that it is likely that the greatest impact of this trade was to stimulate new 
European consumer wants, and indeed it is striking that the growth of demand for almost every 
Asian commodity generated the search and  development of alternate sources of supply outside 
Asia: ‘ Caribbean coffee and sugar, and European silk, porcelain and most famously cotton textiles all 
arose to limit or eliminate the competing Asian product from the European markets.’17  
Total Value of Imports to Britain, France, and the Dutch Republic in the 1770s (millions of guilders)18 
Source of Imports Britain    France   Netherlands Total % of Total Imports 
W.Hemisphere   57.4   71.9     22.4  151.7  32.3 
Asia    24.2     8.6     20.0    52.8  11.2 
Total   151.1  171.1   147.4                  
 
One factor contributing to the difference between levels of trade with Asia and with the 
New World was how the different trades were organized.  As we know, the early modern trade to 
Asia was primarily conducted through national monopoly companies that competed vigorously with 
each other:  the EIC (1600), VOC, (1602) the Compagnie des Indes Orientales,(1684), and the 
Ostend,(1722) Danish (1668 and 1732) and Swedish Companies (1731).  Adam Smith blamed the 
slower growth of the East Indies trade on the monopolies: ‘Europe, however, has hitherto derived 
much less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies, than from that with America.’  He 
explained this by the exclusive privileges of the East India Companies. ‘The English, French, Swedes 
and Danes have all followed their [the Dutch] example, so that no great nation in Europe has ever 
yet had the benefit of a free commerce to the East Indies.’19  
Company Organization 
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All the European chartered companies trading to Asia maintained monopolies throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on their trade to Europe, but had to compete with private 
traders in the intra-Asian trade.  They also had to compete back in Europe, selling their goods at 
auction to foreign and domestic merchants. Their different receptions of and reactions to private 
trade were shaped by their individual formations and chronologies as monopoly companies.  We 
now survey those company histories, setting out the different roles of the merchants and the state 
and monopoly status over the period.  
The first English East India Company (EIC) was founded by a group of London merchants and 
granted a monopoly charter by the Crown in 1600.  In 1687 a rival company, the New English East 
India Company, received a charter, but shortly after a joint board of Directors for both companies 
was formed and they amalgamated in 1709.  The Company was dependent on government, but was 
also formed as a joint stock company with funds subscribed by shareholders and under the 
management of a Court of Directors.  It became the largest of the English chartered companies 
trading overseas; it was managed from London and financed by the London merchant community. In 
1708 over £3,000,000 was subscribed by 3,000 shareholders; a £6 million limit was set in 1744.  The 
Company sent 20-30 ships a year to Asia and made annual sales of £1.25 to 2 million dealing via 
Asian merchants and brokers with a mass of small producers in India and in China in addition with a 
number of large producers.  In 1813 a charter legalized the entry of private traders into the East 
Indian trade.  In 1833 the Company ceased to be a trading company; instead its sole purpose running 
the colonial administration of India.  Finally in 1858 the Company was liquidated, and the Crown 
took responsibility for Indian affairs.20 
 The history of the Dutch East India Company is profoundly linked to its trade in spices. With 
its control over the trade in several spices, the VOC build up both a profitable trade between Europe 
and Asia as well as a profitable trade within Asia. It exchanged commodities from all over Asia for 
spices, whilst spices gave the VOC the opportunity to open markets in Asia. These advantages gave 
the VOC the basis for a profitable intra-Asian trade.21 By monopolising not just trade between 
Europe and Asia, but trade in Asia where it could, the VOC maximised profits and thereby reduced its 
requirements for bullion from Europe.22 In the eighteenth century cracks began to appear in this 
system and various developments robbed the system of its initial shine and brilliance.23 Holden 
Furber argued the monopolistic nature of VOC trade made it vulnerable and eventually made it lose 
out to the competition of its rivals.24 His argument, often repeated by historians after him, is that 
while the English East India Company allowed private trade in the intra-Asian trade, the VOC kept a 
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strict monopoly. Although the monopoly system of the VOC had been successful in the seventeenth 
century, the flexibility of private trade made the EIC more successful in the eighteenth century. 
Historians have not seriously doubted that the VOC retained its policy of monopoly well into these 
more demanding times.25 Its system of multiple monopolies has given the VOC the name of the most 
monopolistic company, but is this completely correct?  The regulations, as we will see below, reveal 
a more complex picture. 
Founded in 1664, the first French East India Company, the Compagnie Royale des Indes 
Orientales, was conceived as part of Colbert’s sweeping commercial and economic reforms at the 
beginning of Louis XIV’s reign. Whilst it was designed as an emulation of its Dutch counterpart, its 
foundation was clearly a mercantilist state initiative and did not originate from within the French 
trading community itself. Probably as a consequence it failed to attract the necessary financial 
backing of French commercial and trading interests and drew most of its initial and subsequent 
capital from Crown investment: only 16 % of the initial capital was provided by merchants, against 
45 % from the king and the royal family, and 19.5 % and 8.5% by the high nobility, ministers, 
parlementarians, and by financiers respectively, both groups which were subject to pressure by the 
administration.26This first Company continued to be a state concern, acting as a tool in its 
mercantilist arsenal, rather than a truly merchant-run trading organisation. Hence it was never 
economically successful and fell into a gradual decline after the Colbert’s death in 1683, after the 
heavy losses it sustained during the Franco-Dutch War (1672-78), the War of the League of Augsburg 
(1688-97), and especially the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14). In those periods of Company 
weakness, private trade flourished: it was officially permitted, albeit Company regulated, from 1682 
onwards, and a private consortium was the first to organise a successful voyage to China in 1698. 
Most of these private ventures originated in Brittany, in Saint-Malo especially, with Parisian financial 
backing. The resulting strength of the private shipping interest and its self-confidence built on its 
successes would stand in opposition to the Company’s monopoly throughout the following 
century.27 
 
Whilst the strength of independent trade was one characteristic of the French Company, 
paradoxically, so was government control. If the first French Company began as a government 
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initiative and as a tool of economic policy, so too did the second one, known simply as the 
Compagnie des Indes. It was conceived as a cornerstone of Law’s infamous bank and paper-money 
scheme: the Mississippi bubble of 1718-21 saw the merger of the new West Indies, the old East 
Indies, and the private China Company in May 1719 and a boom in its shares which ended with the 
ultimate collapse of the bank in 1720. Despite the complete loss of share value and hyperinflation in 
the short term, the new Company, after some post-Law reorganisation, ultimately developed into a 
strong concern with a significant presence in India.28 
 
State involvement, however, remained a salient feature of this Company as well: The king 
continued to give funds to the organisation, which was constantly short of money. In return, the 
Company was closely supervised by the government in the form of the contrôleur général or his 
agents who had the power to veto or impose any decisions on the directors and the shareholder 
assembly.29  The combination of a constant need for government backing and the perceived strength 
of private shipping meant that significant opposition to monopoly trading was voiced and garnered 
strength much earlier than in Britain and resulted in the abolition of the Company’s monopoly in 
1769. This was not at all considered as contrary to the national interest: supported by several other 
well-placed figures in the French administration, the then controller general, d’Invau, himself 
commissioned the French writer, economist, and polemicist, the abbé André Morellet, to publish a 
call for the abolition of the monopoly.30 The to-and-fro pattern continued however, and a third 
monopoly Company briefly made its appearance in the 1780s. Once again it was a state concern, so 
much so that it is still generally known as the ‘Calonne Company’, after the then controller general, 
Calonne, who designed and implemented it. Founded in 1785, the Company existed only briefly. Its 
monopoly status was quickly revoked under the Revolution and it was definitely suppressed in 
1793.31 In the French case state control and monopoly coexisted over the long term with strong 
private trade interests and a prominent anti-monopoly ideology. 
 
Eighteenth-century Scandinavia was the base for two East India companies.  The Danish 
Company resembled the English and the Dutch companies in so far that it was founded in the early 
seventeenth century (1616). Like the French and the English companies its main foothold in Asia was 
made up of a network of factories in South Asia, the most important being Tranquebar on the 
Coromandel Coast and Serampore close to Calcutta. When the company was reconstituted (as the 
Asiatisk Kompagni, AK) in 1730 a regular trade with China was establish. A year later the Swedish 
East India Company (Svenska ostindiska kompaniet, SEIC) was founded. This company had strong 
links to the Ostend Company which, due to international pressure on the Hapsburg emperor, was 
force to cease its trade in 1730. Like the Ostend Company the Swedish traded almost exclusively 
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with China, only six expeditions were sent to India between 1731 and 1806.32 While both companies 
were founded as monopolies, they were strongly connected to networks of private European 
merchants.  Monopoly integrated private trade perhaps to a greater degree than in any of the 
Companies. 
In spite of their different histories the Scandinavian companies had much in common. Both of 
them were mainly providing markets outside the domestic realms of the country in which they were 
based. In the Danish case 77% of the Chinese goods imported between 1734 and 1752 were re-
exported, increasing to 81% between 1753 and 1772.33 In the Swedish case the domestic market 
only absorbed 10% of the goods from China, the rest was re-exported.34 To both companies the 
trade with China and particularly that in Chinese tea became increasingly important. The tea that 
arrived in Copenhagen and Gothenburg was sold on to wholesalers, many in the Low Countries, who 
provided tea to smugglers working on the British market.35 Moreover, Scandinavian trade was in no 
small measure influenced by merchants located outside Scandinavia, in the Swedish case there was 
a strong Scottish presence and in the Danish case Dutch merchants were very active.36 Finally both 
companies were based in small neutral states, something that gave them opportunities to trade 
freely, and with less competition, during periods of conflict between the Dutch Republic, Britain, and 
France.  
Regulations on private trade 
 While all the companies claimed monopoly control over their trade to Asia, they competed 
both with each other and with private merchants in the intra-Asian trade.  They also faced 
competing markets for the goods in Europe.  They sought to control this competition at European 
wholesale auctions by regulating the quantities of specific commodities supplied, through their 
warehouse holdings, in anticipation of the actions of their rivals.  In these markets they operated a 
form of oligopolistic competition.37  Other goods came into these auctions, and into wider European 
markets via the Company privilege trade.  Regulations on private trade and the privilege trade were 
set down by each Company, and regularly reviewed, and each Company displayed different attitudes 
to private trade.  
 If we turn first to private trade and the English East India Company we can use Ian Bruce 
Watson’s definition of private trade as a ‘portmanteau term delimiting all trade with the East Indies 
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and within the East Indies, not conducted for the Company’s benefit.’ Within the private trade 
system, there were several different commercial actors at work. Company servants stationed in the 
East engaged in their own trade within Asia and also with Europe, illicitly. The Commanders and 
seamen of East India vessels also formed an important group of private traders, and were also 
heavily involved in conveying the profits created by Company servants in their East Indian trade back 
home. There were also so-called ‘free merchants’, often ex-Company servants, who were permitted 
to carry on trade in the East provided they did not encroach on the Company’s monopoly.38 
 
In the seventeenth century, private trade was generally viewed with hostility by the English 
East India Company’s Court of Directors, and was considered to pose a threat to the stability of the 
corporate structure. While the EIC continued to monopolise the trade of Asian goods to Europe, a 
series of decrees issued from the 1660s eventually granted permission to its own servants, mariners 
and free merchants to engage in intra-Asian trade. The Company effectively withdrew from the 
‘country trade’, and legally permitted its servants to conduct business between Asian port-cities on 
their own accounts, alongside their role as Company servants. 39 In formal terms, the right to trade 
privately was extended in 1675 to “any commodity… to any port or places in the East Indies to the 
northward of the equator, except to Tonkin and Formosa”. Company employees resident in the 
factories established across the Indian Ocean world freely and successfully engaged in intra-Asian 
trade throughout the eighteenth century; private fortunes became ‘increasingly visible perquisites’ 
of Company service.40 Although private trade had the potential to facilitate the acquisition of 
sizeable fortunes, few men actually returned home to England as ‘men of means’ anyway; most 
were unable to enjoy the fruits of their labours in Asia.41 
Over the course of the eighteenth century, British merchants emerged as probably the 
largest and most successful group of Europeans engaged in ‘private trade’ in Asian waters.42 This 
branch of Indian Ocean commerce has received a great deal of scholarly attention in its own right.  
The pioneering work of Holden Furber, Ian Bruce Watson and P.J. Marshall provided a detailed 
picture of the extent, scope and mechanics of intra-Asian private trade, from the late seventeenth 
through to the end of the eighteenth century.43 This work emphasised the extent to which private 
trade played a central role in transforming the Indian Ocean economy and supporting the East India 
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Company’s commercial hegemony from the middle of the eighteenth century.  The private trade in 
China became particularly sophisticated, and will be detailed below. 
This private trade was enhanced by the privilege trade allowed to supercargoes, 
commanders and various other ships personnel on individual voyages.  See Appendix 1.  
Earl H. Pritchard in the 1950s, and Huw Bowen more recently, sought to detect long-term 
trends in the volume, value, and structure of Euro-Asian private trade.44 Regulations for private 
trade changed considerably over the course of the eighteenth century, but the research conducted 
by Bowen, Pritchard and others suggests that despite the many restrictions and constraints that 
were put in place to safeguard the profitability of the chartered companies in China, private traders 
had considerable space for manoeuvring. In fact, every alteration of private trade regulations 
created a new set of opportunities which individual Company servants were quick to discover and 
use to their own advantage. When the Company prohibited the import of tea in private trade in 
1730 for instance, China traders did not simply stop buying tea. Instead, they interpreted this 
prohibition as referring to Bohea tea only (the cheapest available black tea) and quickly moved into 
buying the fine and expensive teas such as Hyson, Chulan, Congo and Kaywon that the Company was 
not trading in. They successfully developed the top-end market of tea in which the Company never 
attempted to compete.45 
The amount of goods supercargoes registered as private trade on their homeward journey 
from China gradually decreased over the course of the eighteenth-century (as rightly pointed out by 
Pritchard), but this downward trend was cushioned by the substantial amounts of ‘presents’ that 
suddenly appear in the commerce journals of China voyages (especially in the 1760s and 1770s). 
These ‘presents’ seem more likely to be commissions as they were registered by individual 
supercargoes, intended for delivery to numerous EIC directors, MPs and their wives.46 Around this 
time too, supercargoes started to remain in China for more than one year and were thus 
participating increasingly in the intra-Asian trade. In a parallel development to the descending 
commodity trade of supercargoes in the direct trade with Europe (that was still substantial in the 
mid-eighteenth century), we see the rise in tonnage occupied by commanders and officers on China 
voyages. Whereas simple seamen were allowed to fill their seaman’s chest (and often half a tea-
chest extra) with decorative knick-knacks from the famous shopping street in Canton, a commander 
in 1788 could legally import thirty-eight tons of merchandise from China.47 Another twenty-four tons 
were distributed among the officers of the ship according to rank. In addition to that, commanders 
were allowed to fill the hull of the ship with ballast (preferably porcelain) on private account. 
Depending on rank and personal circumstances, private trade privileges or licences (that had to be 
paid for) were generously distributed among the China traders. 
 In the Dutch case historians have frequently treated private trade as corruption 
since the VOC did try to maintain its monopoly over the intra-Asian trade. 48 They take the view that 
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the VOC ‘perished under Corruption’ as the VOC servants evaded any prohibition on a large scale. 
Yet the VOC did allow some private trade in Asia, but the literature considers this to be the 
exception rather than the rule. 49 The best known example is Deshima in Japan. Kambang trade, or 
private trade on VOC ships between Deshima and Batavia was allowed by the Japanese authorities in 
Nagasaki for political reasons.50 At the same time, the Chinese Junk trade was considered as vital to 
the prosperity of Batavia, even though it meant allowing strange merchants in the heart of its 
commercial empire.51 Recently, the policy of the VOC has been placed in a new light, as more 
pragmatic in its view of private trade. The idea of freedom of trade was not without precedent and 
arose frequently throughout the whole period of the existence of the Company.52 Occasionally the 
VOC even acted on these ideas.53 From 1740 onwards, however, the VOC structurally allowed 
private trade in the intra-Asian trade and constantly reassessed the rules to fit its own interests. 54  It 
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defined and kept on redefining the articles it still considered under monopoly and what commodities 
were allowed for private trade. At first, the VOC viewed allowing private trade in the intra-Asian 
trade as a way to optimize its trade in Asia, but after 1771 this became a tool in the competition with 
its rivals and in the fight against decline.55 The lasting existence of institutions related to private 
trade further points to the change of attitude of the VOC towards private trade in Asia.56 There was 
even a separate trading company set up to manage the trade to Sumatra (1749-1759).57 Probably 
the best known example is the Opium Society, which was a private company trading opium to the 
Indonesian Archipelago on behalf of the VOC .58  
  
The private trade to Europe on company ships has been less studied. The first book that 
shed a little light on the subject was primarily aimed at how the trade of the commanders of VOC 
ships was organised.59 This is a distinguishing feature of early modern shipping in general, as 
commanders and the officers on board of ships were paid little, they were compensated with private 
trade privileges. This is true for all commanders and officers of the VOC as well as of the other 
companies, who sailed either between Europe and Asia or in Asia itself. Again, a system of regulation 
existed for this trade, as for instance the VOC became wary of indulging the commanders and 
officers too much. 
 
The VOC was strict in disallowing private trade in spices in the return voyages and in the 
intra-Asian trade, much stricter than its sister organisations. As it depended much less on such new 
goods as tea and textiles than the other companies, the VOC was in turn much more indulgent in 
giving private trade privileges in these commodities.  Nierstrasz’s In the Shadow of the Company, 
argues that a similar freedom existed for private trade in textiles to Europe. An example is, the 
authorization of the shipment to Holland on VOC ships of certain prescribed amounts of cloth 
granted to employees and free-burghers after 1771.60  
 In the case of the French Companies, the swings from monopoly to free private trade and 
back, did not mean however, that under monopoly rules no private trade would take place. Whilst it 
was illegal for private ships to engage in any trade to and from Europe past the Cape of Good Hope, 
other forms of private trade were not only permitted but in certain periods even actively 
encouraged. These fell into two broad categories, the so-called country trade within Asia, known in 
French as the ‘commerce d’Inde en Inde’, and the official allowances of all sailors and officers to 
conduct some trade onboard the Company ships. In practice, both of these starkly exposed the limits 
of state and company control.  The Company permitted its staff in India to engage in the country 
trade, a practice particularly encouraged by Dupleix who, as a governor of the Company’s Bengal 
headquarters in Chandernagore sought to increase the French settlement’s wealth and commerce  
by attracting outside traders and investment. Intra-Asian trade, in which he himself heavily engaged, 
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did indeed bring prosperity and growth to the town, as well as establishing his own personal 
fortune.61 The most prominent feature of this type of private trade was its supranationalism: 
Dupleix’s associates were by no means all French. Although personal relationships were at the root 
of all cooperation in these ventures, those often cut across nationalities and were maintained even 
at times of military conflict between those very nations. Dupleix’s partners were not only prominent 
French employees in India, but also members of rival Companies, such as Sichterman of the Dutch, 
Sobonamille of the Ostend, and Stackhouse of the English Companies, as well as private European, 
Indian, and Armenian merchants residing in India.62 
 
The predominance of private interest over official Company and Royal policy equally 
characterised the second form of private trade conducted during monopoly periods, the private 
trade between Asia and Europe via Company ships. In the French Company, as in the other European 
Companies, each sailor and officer was theoretically permitted to use a certain amount of the ship’s 
capacity for his own personal trade. In France, this fell into two categories. The normal port-permis 
was fixed in value rather than weight or space and allocated according to rank. It consisted of private 
money handed over to the Company who would use it to buy products in Asia, to sell them at their 
usual auctions back in France, and would then hand back the profits to the sailor in question. 
However, apart from the normal port-permis, all personnel on board were also accorded a ‘petit 
port-permis’, which could consist in merchandise bought privately by the sailors. This privately 
bought merchandise, usually referred to as ‘pacotilles’, showed once again the limits of Company 
and state control. In theory it was subject to strict rules: it was limited both in terms of quantity and 
could not consist in any ‘marchandises prohibées’, goods that were banned from import into France, 
namely Asian fabrics which the state considered a threat to its own textile manufacturing base. In 
practice these rules were totally ignored: the amounts accorded were constantly exceeded and the 
rules governing the choice of permitted articles were not adhered to. Instead, a major constituent 
seems to have been precisely those Asian textiles that were illegal and immensely popular in France: 
Indian printed and painted cottons. The importance and popularity of the illegal pacotilles never 
wavered, despite the efforts of both the India Company and the tax authorities to eradicate them, 
since apart from serving to introduce illegal goods, they took up space onboard, even led to 
overloading, and could threaten the Company’s own official trade.63 
 
Private trade, when considered as an alternative to monopoly trade, was thus not 
necessarily perceived as contrary to the French national interest. Depending on shifts in economic 
thinking, the state actively promoted private initiatives to take over, either licensing them, as in the 
late seventeenth century, or orchestrating itself the campaign for the monopoly’s abolition as in 
1769. It was the actual practice of private trade that revealed the limits of the Company and through 
it those of the state controlling it, both of which failed to regulate co-operation with rival companies 
and nations, even in times of military conflict, infringements on the Company’s trade by excessive 
loading of private goods, and, above all, the smuggling on a massive scale of forbidden or heavily 
taxed goods. 
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Private trade was particularly important to the Scandinavian Companies. It could be 
conducted legally by staff belonging to the Scandinavian East India companies. In the Swedish case, 
and up until 1748, members of the crew were allotted a certain amount of cargo space (what was 
referred to as “fri förning”) on the ships for transport of private goods or pacotille. This space was 
available both for both the outward and the homeward journeys. How much space was allotted 
more precisely varied. The Danish company also had regulations for how much different members of 
the crew were allowed to bring home and how it was to be dispersed  (selling it at auctions).64 One 
example from 1787 stipulates that the Captain of a ship going back from China on behalf of the AC 
was allowed to bring “all sorts of goods that could fit into a chest 156 x 76 cm big, and 75 kilos of silk 
textiles. The size of the chests and the amount of silk allowed depended on the rank of ships’ 
personnel.65  
In Sweden the system of allotted spaces was abolished in favour of system of “privilege 
money” in 1748. Pending on rank, each member of the crew received a sum of money. For a voyage 
to Canton this gave the Captain 8,000 silver dollars, the Ship’s doctor 1,500, and the seaman three 
monthly wages.66 One of the reasons for this change was, according to Koninckx, that the monopoly 
of the company was seen to be threatened by the large amount of private trade taking place. 
Koninckx estimates also indicate that the value of the privately traded goods was great. Evidence 
from eight expeditions to China between 1743 and 1748 suggests that the value of the private goods 
ranged between 21.5% and 42.4% of the value of the total cargo, with an average of 28.5%!67 
Included in these numbers are also the pacotille allowances of the supercargoes. On-going research 
into the trade involving supercargoes working for the Swedish company also suggests they were 
responsible for an extensive private trade.68 It is likely that the Swedish company and the level of 
private trade it generated (at least between 1731 and 1748) were unique. The Swedish company, to 
a greater degree than in the case of the other companies, was controlled by a network of merchants 
with experience from the Ostend trade.69 Several of them were of Scottish origin (e.g. Charles Irvine 
and Colin Campbell). They not only worked as supercargoes on the Swedish ships, they were also 
engaged in financing the expeditions, drawing on their own fortunes, and securing funds abroad 
(using their contacts with Ostend financiers). Moreover, they functioned as principal agents buying 
up goods at the company auctions in Gothenburg and re-exporting them to Amsterdam and 
Hamburg.70  
The China Trade and Specific Commodities 
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A sophisticated integration of Company and private trade developed especially in the China 
trade.  Here the supercargoes played a particularly significant role mixing diplomacy and 
entrepreneurship.  Extensive archival work on the official trade between Europe and China has 
provided a detailed picture of the volume, timing and organization of European trade with China.71 
At the same time, new and exciting scholarship on Canton and Macao has challenged the long-held 
view of a rigid and unchanging Canton trade system that was exclusive, impersonal and strictly 
functional.72 A focus on individual groups of traders, the role of women and sociability, shopkeepers 
and local manufacturing, friendship and knowledge transfer has opened up new questions about 
informal cross-Company networks and the functioning of private trade in Asia at a time when the 
China trade system was in full bloom.73 Much more research is needed on the dense private trade 
networks that linked the South China coast to the Indian Ocean world, for these macro-regions have 
hitherto been studied as separate units. 
It is well known that all Company trade was mediated and thus controlled by a small group 
of Chinese wholesalers at Canton (the hong merchants) who placed orders on behalf of foreign 
merchants with producers of all major export goods such as tea, porcelain and silk. The management 
of the Company affairs in China lay in the hands of a small group of Company representatives, called 
supercargoes. During the trading season, these supercargoes (representing a curious mix between 
commission agent, entrepreneur and diplomat) rented apartments (factories) in Canton on a small 
strip of land facing the river from where they conducted their daily business. The trading season was 
limited by the changing monsoon winds, but would usually last for five to six months.74 During this 
short period of time, both official and private trade was conducted; chiefly by those who had the 
means and the privilege to do so. Commanders of East Indiamen, high-ranking officers and 
passengers on board (together with the supercargoes just mentioned) all engaged in extensive 
private trade.75 
East India Company servants actively traded in a wide range of Chinese luxury export wares. 
They developed lucrative niche markets in Europe for these goods, in which the EIC never showed 
any sustained interest.76 With the partial exception of the French and Dutch East India Companies, 
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which regularly included things like fans, lacquerware and wallpaper in their shopping lists (although 
further research must test whether this was not also part of the pacotille of their servants), the 
general trend for the Companies was to reduce the range of commodities to a few fairly 
standardised products. The English East India Company, for instance, narrowed its portfolio 
considerably and invested in the 1770s only in tea, cheap blue & white porcelain, and raw and 
woven silks.77 Tea (moving from green to black teas of middling quality) quickly became the principal 
export good of the English East Company leaving a wide range of consumer goods to the investment 
of their servants (including the directors). By contrast, British private traders kept a very wide 
portfolio by dealing in customized, high-end products or fashionable souvenirs in addition to goods 
like arrack, gunpowder, drugs and gold. Over the course of the eighteenth century private traders 
ordered a stunning variety of Chinese export wares ‘by which the company either cannot gain at all 
by, or are not so gainful as others they prefer to engage in’.78 
 
In the case of the tea trade before the English Tea Commutation Act of 1784 which imposed 
duties of 119% on tea imports, conditions were ripe for a competitive trade among the other 
European companies, extensive private trade, re-export and smuggling.  An important focus 
developing out of this was a new attention to different types and qualities of tea: black tea such as 
Bohea, Soatchoun, Congo, Peckoe, and Linchisin, and green tea such as Heysan, Heysan-Skin, and 
Singlo. The Scandinavian companies traded in higher quality teas, and engaged with wholesalers in 
Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Hamburg who tested tea imports and responded to developing tea 
tastes in different parts of Europe.  Tea smuggled into Britain was often of a higher quality than legal 
tea, and an East India Company response after the Tea Commutation Act was to move into the trade 
in higher quality teas, and to develop a system of tea tasting and quality control.  The VOC which 
traded in basic different types and higher qualities of tea left left private traders to deal in basic 
Bohea.79   
 
Private trade played an important part in the development of exports of porcelain from 
China. Individual pieces brought into Europe as exotica and curiosities in the sixteenth century gave 
way by the mid seventeenth century to large scale imports of pieces systematically produced for 
Western taste.  Increasingly after the mid eighteenth century private trade took more of this trade.  
The VOC after 1756 declared that its official imports from China were to include only ‘current ware,’ 
that is dinner plates, tea and coffee cups and saucers, and wares bringing in a fixed profit.  The 
English East India Company did likewise in the 1770s, restricting official imports from China to tea 
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and standard lines of silks and chinaware.  Privilege and private trade provided the route through 
which specialty goods were imported.80  W.A. Godden estimates that ‘three quarters of the Chinese 
export market porcelain now in national and private collections in Britain…is Private Trade rather 
than chinaware purchased by the EIC’.81 The East India Companies and the commission trade 
associated with them also developed markets in Europe for large dinner services, and especially for 
armorial porcelain; they connected with Chinese Hong merchants and built up a whole sector of 
trade and production on ‘export ware’ porcelain.82 Private, commission and privilege trade provided 
risk-free means by which the Companies could test and extend its markets for Asian goods.  In turn 
the Company infrastructure gave private traders the infrastructure on which to build their 
investments, networks and markets. 
Private Trade and Company Flexibility 
    We have seen how private trade was closely connected to East India Company capacities 
to import into Europe a wide variety and many qualities of Asian goods.  Mercantile connections 
among these traders and European merchants helped to provide wide distribution of these goods 
through European re-export channels, and also helped to develop markets and taste.  Other 
historians have conveyed the part played by private trade in undermining monopoly control through 
principal-agent problems, or in ensuring the enforcement of employment contracts. 83 Though 
private trade did incorporate many illegitimate elements, these activities also benefited Company 
employees.  
Throughout the eighteenth century, EIC Company directors were heavily involved in private 
trade (often illegally under different flags) without causing much of an outcry among the many 
stockholders of the Company. The close cooperation between Company directors and individual 
traders in the purchase of private trade cargo has only started to be uncovered but promises to yield 
interesting results. Especially in the first half of the eighteenth-century for instance, the directors 
were also among the most conspicuous consumers of customised export wares from China, ordered 
via special commission with those whom they appointed to a lucrative post on a China voyage. 
 Private trade connected with the wider European companies was also closely bound up with 
the remittance of Anglo-Indian fortunes.  We can draw on one example from the Danish East India 
Company. Anglo-Indian money and Dutch and French private capital left India as Indian piece goods 
and saltpetre on Danish ships; they were sold on at public sales in Copenhagen, and the funds then 
transferred to London, Amsterdam and Paris to await their returning nabobs. 84 For the AC the 
access to the relatively cheap money the Anglo-Indian community offered was of central importance 
for their trade with India. More than half of the funds used in procuring Indian goods was Anglo-
                                                          
80
 K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of the English East India Company 1600-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), p. 287; Christian J.A. Jörg, Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade (The Hague:  Springer, 
1982), pp. 102-8. 
81
 W.A. Godden, Oriental Export Market Porcelain (London: Granada Publishing, 1979), pp. 59, 78, 95-104. 
82
 Rose Kerr and Luisa E. Mengoni, Chinese Export Ceramics (London: Harry N. Abrams, 2011). 
83 See Philip Stern, The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British 
Empire in India (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 12. On the agency problem and chartered 
Companies see Julia Adams, Ann Carlos and Stephen Nicholas, ‘Principal–Agent Problems in Early Chartered 
Trading Companies: A Tale of Two Firms’, American Economic Review, 82/2 (1992), 140-45; Watson, 
Foundation for Empire, p.17; Santhi Hejeebu, ‘Contract Enforcement in the English East India Company’, 
Journal of Economic History, 65/2 (2005), 496-523. 
84
 Towards the end of the century there was a shift towards sugar, coffee (imported to India from Batavia and 
Mocha) indigo and cotton (from India). See Feldbaek, 1969, pp. 23, 72, 218. 
21 
 
Indian capital. In the Danish case a further circumstance helped promote the remittance trade. In 
1772, in response to demands from prominent merchants in Copenhagen, the new charter allowed 
private merchants to participate in the trade with India (while the AC kept the monopoly trading 
with China).   
Later on the Danish government allowed for return expeditions to set out from London and 
Ostend. This allowed the return expedition more flexibility in assembling cargos in Europe for export 
to India.85 The one condition the Danish government did not negotiate on was that the Indian cargo 
of the return and direct expeditions had to be sold in Copenhagen. This was to protect Copenhagen’s 
status as a market for East India goods.86 In this they were supported by prominent merchants in 
Copenhagen who benefitted greatly from this trade, re-exporting the goods to other European 
markets.87 The Danish private trade in India had to be Danish in so far that the ships had to be 
registered as belonging to a Danish subject, and the crew had include Danish members, particularly 
those belonging to the crews’ top ranks. A Dane also needed to formally own the cargo. In reality, 
and as Feldbæk has shown, the Anglo-Indians owned and controlled many of the cargoes and ships 
trafficking Denmark and India. The often very thin Danish veneer illustrates the extent to which 
Danish and British authorities (in India) looked away. 
 
Conclusion 
Private trade depended on Company infrastructures, and Company flexibility was enhanced 
by private trade.  Both private and Company trade were intertwined in interesting ways. High-
ranking Company servants in Asia acted both as principals to lower ranking merchants as well as 
agents to their superiors in London. They ran their own complex and sophisticated intra-Asian 
private trading operations, making use of the Company’s ‘architecture’ of trade in the East Indies: 
ships, forts, and factories; as well as taking advantage of their customs concessions granted by local 
rulers. The Company’s directors, often experienced private traders themselves, were well aware of 
the extensive intra-Asian private trade carried on by their servants in India and elsewhere, and were 
often directly involved in private ventures. Only by comparing private and official records it is 
possible to see the extent to which private trade was tolerated and indeed encouraged by the East 
India Company.  As Erickson and Bearman have argued recently private trade provided the means of 
establishing and maintaining ties to a wide range of markets.  As a result of this, it built greater 
interregional contact and transmission of information.  It took the risk of expanding markets in the 
east.88 ‘Private traders wove local interactions into a global institution (the East India Company) 
creating the dense structures we associate with globalizing processes on the back of the existing 
trade infrastructure – the goods, men, and information who travelled on the sanctioned arcs linking 
ports.’89 
The history of the smaller Scandinavian companies almost ceases to make sense without 
taking into account private trade. Recent research on the Swedish company indicates that a third of 
its trade, up until at least 1748, could be labelled private. In the case of the Danish company, it is 
unlikely the Danish Company’s trade with India would have been as extensive as it was without 
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access to Anglo-Indian capital in South Asia. This capital was to a large extent generated by the 
private trade of the EIC’s staff. Of course Anglo-Indian fortunes were also available in Canton/Macau 
where they could be converted into tea and silk for the European market.90 And it is not unlikely that 
this capital inflow, together with a growing demand for tea in Europe, explain why the China trade 
became the most lucrative part of the AC’s trade with Asia.91 In both the Swedish and Danish cases 
foreign capital, markets, knowhow and networks were instrumental for the success of the 
companies. Consequently the Scandinavian companies were very vulnerable to outside changes.  
This survey of private trade and monopoly underlines the importance of studying the close 
interactions of all the European companies and their private trade connections.  Imports of Asian 
goods into Europe was a cross company activity, with an important part played in the types and 
qualities of goods imported by private trade.  Hitherto separate national historiographies have 
obscured the frequent connections, flows of knowledge and personnel, and common practices 
among the various companies and traders within the Asian factories, and even in the European 
entrepots. Our team approach has allowed us to gather the extensive, but dispersed, and often 
highly specialised secondary sources, as well as to tackle the different company archives and sources 
on private trade. Transnational perspectives have led us to a greater appreciation of the role that 
merchant networks (including communities, diasporas, family dynasties) played in comparison with 
and in relation to the great monopoly companies. 
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Appendix 1: European East India Company Private Trade Allowances 
GENERAL REGULATIONS 
EIC regulations: 1770s-80s: Tonnage allowed homeward to the commanders and officers of ships of 
755 tons burthen and upwards is as follows; those of a less burthen are allowed in proportion92 
 Rank 
Ships returning from 
China  
Other return voyages 
  Tons Tons Feet 
Commander 38 30 32 
Chief mate 8 6 16 
Second mate 6 4 32 
Third mate 3 2 16 
Purser 3 2 16 
Surgeon 3 2 16 
Fourth mate 2 1 24 
Fifth mate 1 0 32 
Boatswain 1 0 32 
Gunner 1 0 32 
Carpenter 1 0 32 
 
VOC Regulations: In force from 1717-1743. Selections.93 
Grade 
Number 
of chests 
Number 
of sailors’ 
chests 
Number 
of 
kelders94 
Number 
of pots 
Commander 3 1 6 6 
Preacher with family 3 2 2 2 
Preacher 2 2 2 2 
Captain, Merchant 2 2 2 4 
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Under-merchant, Lieutenant 2   3 3 
1st mate 1 1 2 2 
2nd mate 1   2 2 
Barber, Sergeant 1   1 1 
Ships writer 1     1 
Sailors, Soldiers, Carpenters, Cook, 
etc 1       
French Regulations: 'Petit Port Permis' of Personnel onboard French Company Ships to Pondicherry, 
Chandernagor and Canton as per the Regulations from 173395 
Rank Piastres 
Captain 300 
First Mate 100 
Second Mate 60 
First Lieutenant 30 
Second Lieutenant 20 
Supernumerary 
Lieutenant 10 
Foreman, Boatswain each 12 
Quartermaster 8 
Sailor 6 
Sergeant 6 
Soldier 3 
Ship's Boy 2 
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EXAMPLES OF ACTUAL PERMISSIONS ON SPECIFIC COMPANY SHIPS 
Swedish Example: The Swedish Company Space allocated for private trade on Adolph Friedrich 
1746-174896 
Rank Number of Cases 
Captain, 2nd Captain 10 
1st Mate 6  
2nd Mate 4 
3rd Mate 3 
4th, 5th,6thMate, each 1 ½  
Chaplain, Ship’s doctor each 2   
2nd Surgeon, Ships writer, Boatswain, 
Gunner, 1st Carpenter, Purser, Steward, 
Petty officer, Seamen each 
1   
 
 
 
EIC Example: Space allocated for homeward private trade on the China ship York (499 tons) 1750-
5197 
Rank Chests bundles boxes tubs baskets 
Number of total 
containers 
Supercargo  5 
 
9 2 
 
16 
Supercargo 4 
 
20 
  
24 
Commander 181 543 14 20 30 788 
Chief Mate 
  
6 6 
 
12 
2nd Mate 
  
6 5 
 
11 
3rd Mate  
  
3 2 
 
5 
4th Mate 
  
3 2 
 
5 
5th Mate 
   
1 
 
1 
6th Mate 
  
3 
  
3 
Purser 
  
6 3 
 
9 
Surgeon 
  
3 3 
 
6 
Midshipman 
  
3 
  
3 
Seamen 
  
3 
  
3 
Licenced 
individuals 4 
 
7 3 
 
14 
Total of 900 containers registered in private trade on board of the ship York. 
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including individuals with positions such as secretaries, book keepers, cashiers, clerks, shipyard captains, 
warehouse superintendents etc. also had the private trade rights. Ibid, p. 326.The system of allotted spaces 
were abolished in favour of system of “privilege money” in 1748 
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Source: Raw data taken from the China Supercargoes Diaries, IOR/G/12/53 pp. 121-122, British Library. Note: 
this data concerns the privilege trade in goods only. Other forms of remuneration in private trade such as the 
emerging commission system, allowances et cetera are not included in this table. Note also that these are 
figures that were officially registered by the supercargoes on departure from Canton. No statements regarding 
the value of the registered goods have been made that year. Next to fine teas and chinaware, small weight 
high value goods such as drugs and silks feature prominently in this private trade cargo. 
26 
 
2ndEIC Example: Space allocated for homeward private trade on the China ship Norfolk (750 tons), 
1776-177798 
Rank Chests bundles boxes tubs rolls 
Total 
containers 
Commander 317 59 30 3 346 755 
Chief Mate 14 
 
12 
  
26 
2nd Mate 18 
    
18 
3rd Mate (deceased) 6 
    
6 
4th Mate 4 
    
4 
5th Mate 2 
    
2 
Boatswain 2 
    
2 
Purser 16 
    
16 
Surgeon 13 
 
2 
  
15 
Gunner 2 
    
2 
Carpenter 2 
    
2 
Total of registered private trade containers on board of Norfolk = 848 
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Source: Raw data from the China Factory Records, Canton Consultation: 1776-77, IOR/G/12/59 pp. 264, 
British Library. 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
